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Abstract: The meritocratic fairness ideal implies that inequalities in earnings are regarded as 
fair only when they reflect differences in performance. Consequently, implementation of the 
meritocratic fairness ideal requires complete information about individual performances, but 
in practice, such information is often not available. We study redistributive behavior in the 
common, but previously understudied, situation where there is uncertainty about whether in-
equality is reflecting performance or luck. We show theoretically that meritocrats in such 
situations can become very egalitarian in their behavior, and that the degree to which this 
happens depends on how they trade off the probability of making mistakes and the size of 
mistakes that they risk making when redistributing under uncertainty. Our laboratory experi-
ments show, in line with our model, that uncertainty about the source of inequality provides 
a strong egalitarian pull on the behavior of meritocrats. In addition, the external validity of 
our framework, and the results from the laboratory, are supported in two general population 
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A person holding a meritocratic fairness ideal regards inequality in earnings as fair if they 
reflect differences in performance, but not otherwise. This fairness ideal has been shown to be 
prevalent in both the laboratory and the field (c.f. Fong, 2001; Cappelen et al., 2007; Cappelen et 
al, 2013; Almås et al., 2016; Cappelen et al., 2017; Karadja et al., 2017; Gärtner et al., 2017; see 
also Piketty, 1995; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). However, since the 
meritocratic ideal considers the source of income inequality morally relevant, it is not straightfor-
ward to implement in situations where there is uncertainty about the source of inequality. Despite 
such uncertainty being common, we know very little about how meritocrats behave in such cir-
cumstances; this is what we study in the present paper. 
The following situation illustrates the challenge that a meritocrat faces when there is un-
certainty about the source of inequality. Consider two individuals where one earns more on a task 
than the other individual. It is, however, not clear whether the unequal earnings reflect differences 
in performance (in which case the individual with the higher earnings is also the best performer) 
or luck (in which case the individual with the lower earnings could be the best performer). When 
deciding whether to redistribute earnings between these two individuals, a meritocrat has to make 
a trade-off between two potential mistakes. On the one hand, if she chooses to redistribute, she 
might eliminate an inequality that reflects differences in performance. On the other hand, if she 
chooses not to redistribute, she might accept an inequality that does not reflect performance dif-
ferences.  
To the extent that earnings are an informative signal of performance, i.e., it is at least 
weakly more likely that the individual with the highest earnings is also the best performer, the first 
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mistake is more likely than the second. A meritocrat would therefore minimize the expected devi-
ation from what she considers fair by treating the highest earner as if she was indeed the best 
performer. This, however, would also involve the possibility of very large deviations from fairness 
because the best performer might end up with the lowest income. To minimize the size of the 
largest possible deviation from fairness, the meritocrat would rather have to equalize the income 
of the two individuals.    
We use a simple theoretical framework to illustrate this trade-off, and to guide our thinking 
about redistributive choices in this kind of situation. The model shows that uncertainty generates 
an “egalitarian pull” to the behavior of meritocrats. Further, the strength of this pull is increasing 
in the convexity of the loss function, i.e., the extent to which the individual deciding about redis-
tribution has a relatively stronger distaste for making larger (but less probable) errors compared to 
making smaller (but more probable) errors.  
We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the behavior of meritocrats under un-
certainty and test the predictions of the model. The first part of our laboratory experiment is a work 
stage where participants perform a task. In the second part, the earnings stage, participants are 
randomly matched in pairs. One person in the pair is allocated a high earning of USD 20 for her 
performance in the work stage, whereas the other person is assigned a low earning of USD 0. This 
allocation comes about in one of two ways: either the high earning is allocated to the person who 
performed the best in the work stage, or it is allocated by a coin flip.  
In the third part, the redistribution stage, an impartial spectator decides how to split the 
total earnings of the two people in the pair between them. The experiment varies the probability 
that the initial earnings allocation is determined by performance. The spectator is informed about 
this probability, but not about who actually performed the best – however, in our experimental 
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design, the fact that a person was allocated the high earning is at least a weakly informative signal 
of superior performance.  
We document that over 75 percent of the participants in the laboratory experiment can be 
described as meritocrats in the sense that they allocate the highest income to the best performer 
when there is no uncertainty about who this is. On average, the meritocrats award close to 90 
percent of the total earnings to the high earner in this situation. Furthermore, we document that the 
meritocrats become significantly more egalitarian in their behavior when there is uncertainty about 
the source of inequality. When, for example, the probability that the high earner was also the best 
performer is 75 percent, the meritocratic spectators let the high earner keep less than 60 percent of 
the total earnings. Taken together, our findings reveal an intuitive, but, to the best of our 
knowledge, previously undocumented meritocratic origin of egalitarian behavior. In the face of 
uncertainty, individuals with meritocratic preferences act in an egalitarian manner in their distrib-
utive choices.  
To investigate the external validity of our framework and findings, we also conduct two 
large-scale surveys of the general populations of the United States and Norway. We confirm the 
relevance of our framework as we document both Americans and Norwegians viewing earnings 
as, at best, an imperfect signal of superior performance– i.e., the kind of uncertainty that we are 
investigating is perceived as being prominent in society. In both countries, the surveys also docu-
ment that a vast majority of people can be described as meritocrats in the sense that they find it 
more fair when hard work and talent determine earnings than when luck does (80 percent of the 
Norwegian and close to 70 percent of the American population subscribe to this fairness view). 
Finally, we document that uncertainty about the source of an inequality makes both American and 
Norwegian meritocrats more willing to redistribute income. Moreover, this tendency is stronger in 
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Norway than in the United States, and in that sense, our findings provide a potential explanation 
for why societies can differ significantly in their support for egalitarian institutions, even if they 
share the same meritocratic fairness ideal.  
Our paper contributes to the extensive literature that seeks to understand how social pref-
erences shape behavior (Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; 
Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Cappelen et al., 2007; Bartling et al., 2012; 
Falk and Szech, 2013; Bartling et al., 2015; Mollerstrom et al., 2015; Almås et al., 2017; Hufe et 
al., 2018). An important strand of this research investigates how the source of an inequality matters 
for whether it is perceived as fair. Regardless of ewhether this research uses surveys (Alesina et 
al., 2001; Fong, 2001; Karadja et al., 2017; Gärtner et al., 2017) or laboratory experiments (Konow 
1996; 2000; 2009; Cappelen et al., 2007; Krawczyk, 2010; Cappelen et al., 2013; Cappelen et al., 
2017; Bartling et al., 2018), the nearly unanimously reached conclusion is that inequalities that are 
due to luck are regarded as less fair than those rooted in performance differences.1 We add to this 
literature by studying how uncertainty about the source of inequality affects distributive behavior. 
Our paper also relates to a small but growing literature that considers the effects of uncer-
tainty on redistributive preferences. Cettolin and Riedl (2016) show that there is less redistribution 
attempted when there is uncertainty about whether low earners in the experiment would actually 
benefit from the redistribution. Charness et al. (2015) consider the related question of optimal 
compensation in a gift-exchange game under uncertainty about employee ability levels. Cappelen 
et al. (2018) study the trade-off between giving some individuals more and others less than they 
deserve in situations with limited information, and find that people are more averse to giving peo-
ple less than they deserve. Bortolotti et al. (2018) consider the impact of uncertainty regarding 
                                                          
1 See also Piketty 1995; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005 and Benabou and Tirole, 2006 for seminal theoretical work focused on the 
formation of beliefs regarding sources of inequality.  
6 
 
whether a person has cheated or not on the willingness to redistribute, and document that the mere 
suspicion of cheating changes third party fairness views considerably. Finally, Cappelen et al. 
(2019) consider how people handle a situation with limited information where the earnings of an 
individual is determined by both productivity and luck. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design and implemen-
tation of the main experiment, and of a small experimental extension. Section 3 presents our the-
oretical framework, and Section 4 presents our experimental results. Section 5 describes the de-
sign, analysis, and results of the surveys, and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
Each experimental session consisted of three parts: 1) the work stage, 2) the earnings stage, 
and 3) the redistribution stage. All participants made decisions in all parts. Participants were told 
at the beginning of the session that there would be several parts and that instructions would be 
given for one part at a time, right before the start of that part (all experimental instructions, includ-
ing quizzes, are available in Online Appendix A).  
In the work stage, all participants performed a math task in which they had five minutes to 
add up as many sets of five two-digit numbers as possible without using a calculator (Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007). Participants were not given a piece rate compensation, but were told that their 
performance might influence their earnings later in the experiment and that, were this to be the 
case, it would be beneficial to have completed more tasks correctly.  
In the earnings stage, participants were paired anonymously. Each pair was informed that 
one participant had earned USD 20 and the other USD 0 for the work completed in the work stage; 
they would, however, only receive the information about whether they themselves were a high or 
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low earner at the very end of the experiment. Furthermore, the participants were told that the earn-
ings had been determined by either luck or performance. In the case of luck, the participant who 
was lucky in a computerized fair coin toss had earned USD 20, whereas in the case of performance, 
the participant who completed the most math tasks correctly in the work stage had earned USD 20 
(ties were broken randomly by the computer). 
Thereafter, the redistribution stage was introduced. All participants were told that they had 
been matched to one of the pairs formed in the earnings stage, and that they would make choices 
regarding the distribution of earnings for that matched pair of participants (referred to as Person 1, 
P1, and Person 2, P2). It was made clear that this choice would have no monetary consequences 
for the participant herself as she was making decisions as an impartial spectator for another pair, 
not for her own pair. We used the strategy method, with each spectator exposed to, and making 
decisions in, seven situations involving P1 and P2. The spectators knew that one of the seven 
situations corresponded exactly to what had happened in their matched pair (but they did not know 
which one), that there were exactly two spectators matched to each pair (this was done in order for 
each pair to be matched to the same number of spectators), and that one of the two spectators’ 
choices in this situation would be chosen randomly and implemented as final earnings for the pair.  
In each of the seven situations, the spectators were informed about who in the pair had 
earned USD 20 and who had earned USD 0. They were furthermore informed about the probability 
that performance determined the earnings allocation. In the seven situations, this probability took 
on the values 0, 1, 10, 50, 90, 99, and 100 percent. The order was randomized, and in the main 
analysis we use all choices, but our conclusions remain when only analyzing participants’ first 
choices (Figure B1 and Table B1 in Online Appendix B). The spectators could redistribute any 
amount (including zero) between P1 and P2 in each of the seven situations.  
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After the spectators had made their impartial spectator decisions, but before any infor-
mation about final earnings was provided, all participants filled out a demographic questionnaire 
(age, gender, and ethnicity), which also contained incentivized questions about the statistical con-
cept “probability” and unincentivized questions about personal risk preferences and redistribution 
preferences.2 Finally, before leaving the laboratory, they were paid in private according to the 
selected spectator decision. .  
 
2.1. Implementation  
The experiment was conducted at the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science 
(ICES) laboratory at George Mason University (GMU). Participants were recruited from the la-
boratory’s subject pool, which consists of students from GMU. A total of 222 individuals, who 
could only take part once, participated. The average age was 22 years, and females made up 48 
percent of the sample. Participants earned an average of USD 20 (including a fixed show-up fee 
of USD 5) for their participation in a session that lasted approximately 45 minutes.  
We used z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) to computerize the experiment. To ensure 
common knowledge, the experimental instructions were read aloud in addition to being provided 
on the participants’ computer screens. On three occasions, participants answered a quiz to ensure 
that they understood the instructions. They had to be able to correctly answer the questions to 
continue, and the very few participants who experienced problems with the quiz questions were 
                                                          
2 To determine their knowledge of the statistical concept “probability,” participants answered nine simple questions and were 
rewarded USD 0.50 for each correct answer. The questions told them to imagine a lottery with a certain probability of winning, 
and that they were buying 100 lottery tickets and giving one ticket to each of their 100 best Facebook friends. We then asked the 
participants to tell us how many of their friends, statistically speaking, they would expect to win in the lottery. The probability of 
winning varied between 0, 1, 5, 10, 50, 90, 95, 99 and 100 percent across the nine questions. We added this to the experiment in 
order to be able to investigate if our results differ depending on whether participants with limited knowledge in statistics are 
included in the analysis or not. This turned out not to be the case – see Figures B2 and B3, and Table B2 in Online Appendix B.  
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given repeated instructions by the experimenter until they got the questions right. We implemented 
the quizzes to minimize the risk that subject confusion would obscure the results.  
 
2.2. Experimental Extension: Compound Uncertainty 
Four months after the first data collection, we designed and implemented an extension of 
the original experiment. The objective was twofold: First, we were interested in examining if ad-
ditional, compound uncertainty would add to the inclination of meritocrats to behave in an egali-
tarian manner. Second, we wanted to ensure that the results from the main experiment could be 
replicated.  
The design built closely on the original experiment, but now we implemented two between-
subject treatments. The control treatment was identical to the original experiment. In the com-
pound uncertainty treatment, the spectators were told that the earnings division in the pair had 
been determined by either luck or performance. They were further told that the probability that 
performance determined the outcome could be either 0, 1, 10, 50, 90, 99, or 100 percent and that 
all seven options were equally likely. Just as in the control treatment, the spectators made seven 
decisions. The probability that performance determined the outcome was different in the seven 
situations (just as in the original experiment), but described as a compound lottery in each situation.  
A total of 82 people who had not participated in the main experiment took part in the ex-
perimental extension (51 percent female, average age 22 years). They earned an average of USD 
19.50 for their participation in a 45-minute long session. Treatments were randomized at the ses-
sion level, and with the exception of the differences outlined above, the implementation of the 




3. Conceptual Framework  
We use a simple social preference model to help us to formulate hypotheses, and to organ-
ize the analysis and the interpretation of our results. We denote the two people in a pair H (high 
earner) and L (low earner). Their initial (pre-redistribution) earnings are such that H has a larger 
share s of total earnings than L, i.e. 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 > 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. Redistribution is costless in the sense that the 
total earnings post-redistribution are the same as total earnings pre-redistribution. 
We assume that the spectators find it fair that H, after redistribution, receives a share 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 
of the total earnings (and that L consequently receives a share 𝑠𝑠𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 = (1 − 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃)). We further-
more assume that the spectators dislike it when the distribution of the total earnings post redistri-
bution deviates from what they view as fair, and we capture these preferences with a general loss 
function, 
 
𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃;∙) = −(|𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃|)𝛼𝛼, 
 
where 𝛼𝛼 captures the loss function’s curvature.  
We allow spectators to hold different views about what the fair share to H, 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 , is. First 
consider a spectator who does not view the source of the inequality as relevant when deciding 
about redistribution, meaning that her fairness view is independent of whether H was actually the 
best performer. For such a spectator, there is no uncertainty about what the fair share to H is, and 




spectators is those with a strict egalitarian fairness ideal who view all inequalities as unfair. These 
spectators have 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 = 1 2⁄  and always equalize outcomes.3  
We are primarily interested in the meritocrats, for whom the source of the inequality is 
crucial. This implies that for them, 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 is dependent on whether or not the high earner H is also 
the best performer. We definea spectator to embrace the meritocratic fairness view if she considers 
it fair that the individual who is the best performer (BEST) gets a share 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 > 1 2⁄  of the total 
earnings in the pair. Hence in a situation where H is the best performer, the meritocrat has 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 =
𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 > 1 2⁄ . (If H is not the best performer, 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 = (1 − 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃) < 1 2⁄ ). 
In a situation with no uncertainty about H being the best performer, meritocrats will simply 
set 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃. Under uncertainty, however, a meritocrat cannot be sure that she implements 
the distribution that she considers fair, as this depends on who actually performed the best.  
Let 𝑝𝑝 be the probability that the high earner was also the best performer and let 𝑝𝑝 ≥ 1 2⁄  
(as in the experiment). This implies that the fact that a person has high earnings sends a signal 
about her also being the best performer, with the signal being at least weakly informative (i.e., the 
signal-to-noise ratio is always at least 50 percent). Expanding equation (1) then gives us the ex-
pected loss for a meritocratic spectator: 
 
𝐸𝐸(𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃;∙)) = −𝑝𝑝(|𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃|)𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝑝𝑝)(|𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − (1 − 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃)|)𝛼𝛼 
 
If a meritocratic spectator has a linear loss function, i.e., if 𝛼𝛼 = 1, she simply aims to min-
imize the expected deviation from what she views as the fair distribution. She will then give the 
                                                          
3 Strict libertarians would also remain unaffected by the source of inequality, as they find all initial inequalities in earnings fair. 
Since 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 1 in our experiment, we have that 𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 = 1 for strict libertarians. See e.g. Cappelen et al., 2007 and Mollerstrom et 




highest earner a share of the total payment equal to 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃  as long as the signal is informative, 𝑝𝑝 >
1 2⁄ . In the case where p = 1/2, she is indifferent between giving 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃  to the high or the low 
earner. In contrast, a meritocrat with 𝛼𝛼 → ∞ will equalize the incomes in the pair for all values of 
𝑝𝑝 < 1, because this minimizes the largest possible deviation from what she considers to be a fair 
distribution. Figure 1 illustrates the predicted share redistributed in this framework for various 
values of 𝛼𝛼 in the case where 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃=1. 
 
Figure 1: Predicted Share Redistributed for Meritocrats with Different Values of α 
 
Notes: The figure shows the relationship between the level of uncertainty and the optimal share redistributed given 
(2) and assuming that 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹=1 = 1. For 0.5 < 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 < 1 the plot is similar, with the floor moved up to (1 −
𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃).  
 
We see that any value of 𝛼𝛼 > 1 implies an egalitarian pull, in the sense that it makes mer-
itocrats split more equally than what they do when they know for sure who was the best performer. 
















.5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
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the pull toward egalitarian behavior under uncertainty is therefore increasing in 𝛼𝛼. Also note that 
when 𝛼𝛼 = 2, i.e., when the loss function is quadratic, the amount of desired redistribution is de-
creasing linearly in p.  
From Figure 1, we observe that spectators can have the same meritocratic fairness view 
and the same beliefs about the level of uncertainty, but still behave very differently because they 
differ in the curvature of their loss function. For example, consider two meritocratic spectators 
who both want the best performer to receive the full share, i.e.,  𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 = 1. Further, assume that 
they are in a situation where there is a 75 percent likelihood that the high earner is also the best 
performer. Depending on the curvature of the loss function, i.e. their 𝛼𝛼, one of the spectators may 
redistribute completely (very convex loss function) and the other may not redistribute at all (lin-
ear loss function).  
 
4. Results 
In this section, we present the main results from the experiments, with supplementary 
analysis presented in Online Appendix B. We first provide an overview of the aggregate behav-
ior in the main experiment, before we present individual-level analysis and results from the ex-
perimental extension with compound uncertainty.  
 
4.1 Aggregate Behavior 
We first provide an overview of the spectator behavior in the main experiment. Figure 2 
shows the average share redistributed in each of the seven situations.4 
                                                          
4 This graph looks very similar when only considering participants’ first choice; i.e. when we utilize the between-subject version 
of our experimental design (see Figure B1 and Table B1 in Online Appendix B). 
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Comparing the two extreme situations in Figure 2, we observe that uncertainty creates an 
egalitarian pull. When the spectators know for sure that the high earner is the high performer, they 
find it, on average, fair that the high earner gets almost 80 percent of the total income. In contrast, 
we see almost complete equalization of income when earnings are uninformative of performance. 
We further observe that at the extremes, small changes in probability have almost no effect on 
spectator behavior, which is consistent with the average spectator not having a linear or infinitely 
convex loss function (c.f. Figure 1). Finally, we observe that the share distributed in the interme-
diate situation, where it is 75 percent probability that the high earner is the high performer, is above 
the linear prediction based on the two extreme situations, which is suggestive of the average spec-
tator having a convex loss function with 𝛼𝛼 > 2. 
 
Figure 2: Share Redistributed for Different Values of p  
  
Notes: The figure provides an overview of the average share redistributed in each of the seven situations considered 
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In Table 1, we confirm these patterns in a regression framework, where the dependent var-
iable, share of earnings redistributed, is regressed on the probability that the high earner was the 
best performer. In Table 1, specification (1) has 𝑝𝑝 enter linearly, whereas specification (2) utilizes 
probability dummy variables (with 𝑝𝑝 = 0.5 as the omitted variable). We observe from (1) that, on 
average, an increase in the probability that the high earner was the best performer significantly 
reduces the share redistributed, while (2) shows that the decrease in the share redistributed is sig-
nificant when p>=0.75.  
 
Table 1: Share Redistributed as a Function of p 
 (1) (2) 

































Observations 1554 1554 
 
Note: OLS regressions utilizing the full dataset from the main experiment (n = 1554, i.e. 7 choices each by 222 
spectators). The dependent variable is the share that the spectators redistribute to the lower earner. Standard errors 
(clustered at the level of individual spectators) in parentheses. (1) shows the result from a model linear in p (the 
probability that the high earner was also the best performer), while (2) uses a dummy for each level of p. Omitted 




4.2 Individual-level Analysis 
Having documented average spectator behavior, we now look closer at individual specta-
tors, paying special attention to how the meritocrats react to uncertainty about who is the best 
performer.  
We define a meritocrat as a spectator who wants to allocate more than half of the total 
earnings to the high earner when there is no uncertainty about the high earner also being the best 
performer (i.e., when 𝑝𝑝 = 1). We therefore focus our analysis on the 168 spectators (76 percent of 
our sample) who satisfy this requirement.5 The 168 meritocrats redistribute 47.4 percent (standard 
error = 2.04, median = 50) when 𝑝𝑝 = 0.5 and 11.5 percent (standard error  = 1.11, median = 0) 
when 𝑝𝑝 = 1.  
We use a non-linear least squares estimator to estimate for each meritocratic participant the 
curvature parameter 𝛼𝛼 from equation (2). We allow 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃  (the fair share to the best performer) to 
vary at the individual level and set it equal to the share that an individual meritocrat allocates to 
the high earner when 𝑝𝑝 = 1. The results of the individual estimations are shown in Figure 3. Panel 
A shows the distribution of 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 , and Panel B shows the distribution of the estimated 𝛼𝛼. We see 
from Panel A that the median value of 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃  is 1, meaning that the median meritocrat does not 
redistribute anything to the low earner when the high earner is known with certainty to be the best 
performer. The mean value of 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃  is 0.88. In Panel B, we observe that the median value of 𝛼𝛼 is 
2.5.6  
                                                          
5 Out of the 54 participants who are not classified as meritocrats according to this definition, 24 are strict egalitarians in the sense 
that they split the total earnings equally between the two people in the pair for all seven values of p. In Figures B4 and B5 in Online 
Appendix B we provide a descriptive analysis of the behavior of the participants who cannot be classified as meritocrats.  
6 There is no significant correlation between 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃  and the estimated 𝛼𝛼 (β=0.024, p=0.420). This shows that the curvature of the 
loss function for a person is not correlated with her fairness view on what share of the total pie the superior performer should get.  
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Panel A and B show that meritocrats differ in two important respects:  in what they think 
of as the fair share to give to the best performer, and in the convexity of the loss function. Inter-
estingly, in our sample, we observe that there is greater heterogeneity in the curvature of the loss 
function, with some meritocrats having an extremely convex loss function. The median 𝛼𝛼 is well 
above 2 (73.1 percent of the meritocrats have 𝛼𝛼 > 2 – p < 0.001 for the t-test of proportions, testing 
the null hypothesis that this share is 50 percent). Most importantly, however, we find almost no 
meritocrats with an almost linear loss function, which means that for most meritocrats uncertainty 
creates a significant pull toward more egalitarian behavior.  
 
Figure 3: Individual-level Calibrations for the Meritocrats 
Panel A: Distribution of 𝒔𝒔𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭  
 
Panel B: Distribution of Estimated 𝜶𝜶  
 
Notes: The figures show the distribution of the share allocated to the best performer when p = 1 (Panel A) and the 
estimated 𝛼𝛼 (Panel B). Data for all meritocratic spectators (N = 168). The dotted lines mark the medians of the re-
spective distributions.  
 
4.3 The Experimental Extension with Compound Uncertainty 
The experimental extension, which consists of a control treatment and a compound uncer-
tainty treatment, enables us to study how compound uncertainty shapes spectator behavior and the 
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average behavior of spectators in the compound uncertainty treatment. The seven left-most bars 
show the average behavior in the control treatment, which corresponds to the seven situations 
studied in the main experiment.  
First, we observe that compound uncertainty creates a very strong egalitarian pull in spec-
tator behavior. The average spectator behavior under compound uncertainty is not statistically dif-
ferent from strictly egalitarian behavior, and we observe that the spectators in the compound un-
certainty treatment equalize significantly more than spectators in the control group when p > = 
0.75.  
 
Figure 4: Results from the Experimental Extension 
 
Notes: The figure provides an overview of the average share redistributed in the experimental extension. Data from 
the control treatment are reported in the seven leftmost bars (n = 315, 7 choices each by 45 spectators). Data from 
the compound uncertainty treatment is reported in the bar to the right (n = 259, 7 choices each by 37 spectators). 
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Second, by comparing the spectator behavior under compound uncertainty with the spec-
tator behavior in the situation in the control treatment where 𝑝𝑝 = 0.75, we establish an estimate of 
the causal effect of introducing compound uncertainty on spectator behavior (because the expected 
value of the p is the same in the two treatments). We observe that the introduction of compound 
uncertainty causes a large increase in the share transferred to the low earner (48 percent versus 37 
percent, p = 0.097). Our data thus provide suggestive evidence of compound uncertainty causing 
a stronger egalitarian pull in the distributive behavior compared with simple uncertainty.  
Finally, when inspecting the seven bars to the left in Figure 5, we note that behavior in the 
control treatment in the extension is very similar to that in the original experiment. Pairwise com-
parisons of average behavior for a given level of p in Figure 2 and Figure 5 show that spectator 
behavior is not significantly different for any of the situations considered in the main experiment. 
Moreover, the median values for 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃  (1) and the estimated α (2.5) are the same for participants 
in both the control treatment in the experimental extension and the original experiment.7  
 
5. General Population Surveys 
To investigate the external validity of our framework and results, we conducted two general 
population surveys in the United States (n = 1,002) and Norway (n = 1,019). Our objective for 
conducting the surveys was threefold. First, we wanted to investigate how common (and strong) 
meritocratic preferences are in the general population, second to what extent people view high 
earnings as an imperfect signal of superior performance, and third whether meritocrats react to 
                                                          
7 See Table B3 and Figure B6 in Online Appendix B.  
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uncertainty by being pulled toward an egalitarian behavior. The survey materials are available in 
Online Appendix C. 
 
5.1 Design and Implementation 
To obtain a measure of fairness preferences, our surveys ask the respondents to indicate to 
what extent they find it fair that certain factors determine a person’s income. The factors consid-
ered were talent (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡), luck (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙), and hard work (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙). The answers were given 
on a 0-10 scale, with 0 indicating that the respondent finds it completely unfair if that particular 
factor determines income and 10 that she finds it completely fair. We call a person a meritocrat if 
she finds it more fair that talent and hard work determine income, than that luck does it, i.e., if 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 > 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙, and 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 > 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙.  
In the language of our model from Section 3, we also want to estimate respondents’ per-
ceptions of 𝑝𝑝 (i.e. how likely they think it is that a person with a high income is a superior per-
former). To that end, the survey asked whether respondents agree or disagree with the following 
statement: “In society, it is typically the case that people with a higher income have done a better 
job than people with a lower income” (0-10, with 0 indicating complete disagreement and 10 in-
dicating complete agreement with the statement).  
Finally, to get a sense of 𝛼𝛼, i.e., of how respondents react to uncertainty about whether the 
high earner is also the best performer, we asked respondents to consider a situation where two 
people – Andrew and Bob – had been asked to do a job. The two had been told that the best 
performer would get a bonus of USD 200, while the other would USD 0 (the question asked the 
respondent to assume that everyone, including the respondent herself, agreed that this is fair). The 
question continues: “The problem is that there is uncertainty about who the best performer was. 
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Suppose that you learn that it is more likely that Andrew did the best job. With 75 percent proba-
bility he was the best performer, and with 25 percent probability Bob was the best performer. 
Without knowing any more, how much of the USD 200 would you give to Andrew and how much 
to Bob?” 
In this setting, as shown in Figure 1, a person with a higher 𝛼𝛼 would tend in the direction 
of splitting the earnings equally between Andrew and Bob. However, someone with 𝛼𝛼 close to 1 
would give all or most of the money to Andrew, who is most likely to be the best performer. In 
general, and in the language of our model, there is a negative correlation between the share given 
to Andrew and 𝛼𝛼.  
In addition, the surveys collected demographic information about age, gender, geograph-
ical location, household size, marital status, income, education, and political party preferences. 
The surveys were administered by Research Now (in the United States) and NorStat (in Norway) 
and the samples are representative of the respective populations in terms of gender, age, and loca-
tion. 
 
5.2 Main Results 
Table 2 outlines the results. Considering first the pooled data from both surveys, we start 
by noting that the respondents find it most fair when income differences are determined by hard 
work (the average answer is 8.41). Talent is considered less fair as a determinant of income (8.41 
vs 6.44, p < 0.001 for a two-sided t-test of differences8), but at the same time more fair than luck 
(6.44 vs 3.17, p < 0.001). Comparing the answers to the midpoint of the scale (which is 5), we 
 
                                                          






























note that people on average find it fair when hard work and talent determine income (average 
answers significantly above 5, p < 0.001 for both tests), but on average unfair when luck does so 
(average answer significantly below 5, p < 0.001). We further observe that a large majority of 
respondents, 73 percent, can be described as having meritocratic preferences (the corresponding 
fraction from the laboratory experiment was very similar at 76 percent). 
Importantly, we find that high income is not regarded as an informative signal of superior 
performance. The average answer is 4.22 which is significantly below the midpoint, 5, of the scale 
(p < 0.001), indicating that the average respondent tends to not agree that people with a higher 
income have done a better job than people with a lower income. This suggests that the kind of 
situation studied in the experiment captures a common and important distributive situation in so-
ciety. 
Finally, the answers to the question where it is uncertain whether Andrew or Bob was the 
best performer reveals firstly that only 15 percent of respondents would give the full reward to 
Andrew (who was the best performer with 75 percent probability). On average, the respondents 
stated that they would give 67 percent of the reward to Andrew (if we only consider the respond-
ents who we define as having meritocratic fairness preferences, the share remains virtually un-
changed, at 68 percent). Moreover, we find that the spectators are significantly closer to splitting 
the reward equally between the two individuals than to giving the high earner the full reward (p < 
0.001 for the difference-in-difference test).  
To conclude, the surveys provide evidence of the relevance of our experimental investiga-
tion, and the results are in line with our findings from the laboratory. We find that the meritocratic 
fairness preference is held by a majority of people and that people on average are skeptical of high 
24 
 
income being an informative signal of superior performance. In this distributive setting, we vali-
date our experimental finding by showing that there is a significant egalitarian pull in the distrib-
utive behavior of a meritocratic population.  
 
5.3 Results by Country and Political Affiliation 
Building on the fact that Norwegians demand more redistribution than do Americans, we 
can use our survey to shed light on the extent to which reactions to uncertainty about the nature of 
the distributive situation might contribute to our understanding of why there is such a difference 
between the two countries.9 We also compare liberals and conservatives (with the former demand-
ing significantly more redistribution than the latter) within both Norway and the United States. 
We now return to Table 2 and consider the results by country. The first column for each 
respective country is the average for the full population of that country. There are some notable 
similarities between Norwegians and Americans. In both countries, it is considered most fair when 
income is determined by hard work; there is no significant difference between Americans and 
Norwegians (p = 0.313). Talent as a factor determining income is seen as significantly less fair 
(the 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 score is lower than the 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙  score in both countries, p < 0.001), but the average 
score is still above the midpoint of the scale (p < 0.001 for both countries). Americans find it more 
fair than do Norwegians when income is based on differences in talent (p < 0.001). The largest 
difference between the countries is found for the luck factor, in line with Almås et al. (2019). 
Whereas both Americans and Norwegians find it mostly unfair when luck determines income (the 
score is below the midpoint in both countries, p < 0.001), Norwegians find it significantly more 
                                                          
9 The differences between the United States and Scandinavia regarding demand for redistribution are of interests to economists and 
other social scientists – see e.g. Edlund, 1999; Aaberge et al., 2002; Jantti et al, 2006; Rogerson, 2007; Acemoglu et al, 2012; Aarøe 
and Petersen, 2014; Kleven, 2014; Fochesato and Bowles, 2015; Stiglitz, 2015, and Almås et al., 2019. See also Alesina and 
Glaeser, 2004 who discusses the difference between Europe and the United States, but also extensively discusses Scandinavia.  
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unfair than do Americans (2.22 vs 4.13, p < 0.001). In line with this, the share of meritocrats turns 
out to be higher in Norway than in the United States (80 percent vs 66 percent, p < 0.001). 
We find a striking difference between the United States and Norway in terms of income 
being informative of performance. While Americans marginally find income to be informative of 
performance, Norwegians disagree strongly with this view (5.15 vs 3.32, p<0.001). This is sug-
gestive of Norwegians perceiving there to be more uncertainty about who has been the best per-
former in society, which clearly pulls in the direction of more redistribution.  
Finally, we note that there is a difference between how Norwegians and Americans react 
to uncertainty about who is the best performer. In the question about Andrew and Bob, we first 
note that Americans are significantly more likely than are Norwegians to give the full reward to 
the most likely best performer. On average, Americans allocate 70 percent of the pie to Andrew, 
whereas Norwegians allocate 64 percent (p < 0.001). Moreover, in both countries, people on av-
erage seem to have a convex loss function (α > 2), as their behavior is closer to complete equali-
zation than to giving Andrew the full share. These results also suggest that Norwegians on average 
have a more convex loss function than Americans, as they are closer to equalization of earnings (p 
< 0.001 for test of difference-in-difference).10 
Taken together, the survey provides strong evidence of uncertainty creating a stronger egal-
itarian pull in Norway than in the United States. Norwegians are more likely than are Americans 
to be meritocrats, to perceive there to be significant uncertainty about who is the best performer, 
and to have a more convex loss function. All these three elements pull in the direction of higher 
demand for redistribution in Norway than in the United States.   
                                                          
10 This cross-country result also holds when we, instead of using a t-test, regress the share given to Andrew on country, controlling 
for perceptions of p and/or how (un)fair the person thinks it is that hard work, talent, and luck determine personal income. 
Additional demographic control variables (age, gender, household income can also be included without the result changing). See 
Online Appendix D, Table D1.  
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The analysis can also be done in terms of political affiliation, by comparing people identi-
fying themselves as Democrats (liberal) or Republicans (conservative) in the United States, and 
by splitting Norwegians into “right-of-center” (conservative) and a “left-of-center” (liberal) 
blocks.11 As reported in Table 2 and described in more detail in Online Appendix D, we see that 
our framework can also be relevant for understanding why people with a conservative political 
leaning demand less redistribution than do liberals. We document that conservatives regard it as 
more fair than liberals that luck or talent (and, in the case of Norway, hard work) determine an 
individual’s income. In addition, conservatives also view high income as a more informative signal 
about superior work performance. Finally, liberals tend have a more convex cost function than 
conservatives (but the results for both groups, in both countries, indicate an average α > 2). These 
three elements contribute to explain how uncertainty creates a stronger egalitarian pull for liberals 
than conservatives.  
To conclude, the results from the survey support our framework being relevant for under-
standing differences in redistributive preferences and political opinions outside the laboratory. We 
show that the kind of distributive situation in the experiment, where there is uncertainty about who 
is the best performer, corresponds to how the general population think of high income as a signal 
of superior performance. Both Americans and Norwegians share the characteristic of having an 𝛼𝛼 
that is large enough to give rise to a significant egalitarian pull under uncertainty, regardless of 
whether a person identifies as liberal or conservative. Further, we document that in both societies, 
meritocratic fairness preferences appear to be prominent and people seem to have a convex loss 
                                                          
11 About 72 percent of our American sample define themselves as identifying most strongly with the Republican or the Democratic 
party; the remainder say either that they identify with another party (7 percent) or that they do not identify with a party at all (21 
percent). For Norway, we define as right of center the parties Fremskrittspartiet, Høyre, Venstre and Kristelig Folkeparti, whereas 
Rødt, Sosialistisk Venstreparti, Arbeiderpartiet, Miljopartiet De Gronne and Senterpartiet are left of center. 84 percent identify with 
one of these nine parties (which are the ones currently represented in the Norwegian parliament), whereas the rest identify with 
another party (1 percent) or with no party at all (15.3 percent).  
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function, which implies that in both societies uncertainty about who is the best performer creates 
an egalitarian pull in their distributive behavior. 
 
6. Conclusions 
When deciding on what constitutes a fair distribution of earnings, many people find the 
source of inequality highly important. More specifically, meritocrats find inequalities acceptable 
if they reflect performance differences, but not otherwise, and research has documented that people 
prefer less redistribution when effort generates (or is believed to generate) an inequality than when 
luck does so. However, there is often uncertainty about the source of inequality.  
We report from an experiment that introduces a novel design of varying the degree of un-
certainty about the source of inequality. We use a simple conceptual framework to show that a 
meritocrat can exhibit widely different distributive behaviors depending on how she reacts to un-
certainty. Specifically, a meritocrat who has a strong, relative dislike of making large mistakes will 
experience an egalitarian pull to her behavior. 
In the laboratory, we documented that a vast majority of participants hold meritocratic 
preferences in the sense that they let the high earner keep most of the earnings when there is no 
uncertainty about her also being the best performer. Further, while meritocrats vary widely in their 
response to uncertainty, a strong egalitarian pull is by far the most common response. Thus, we 
document a previously undocumented source of egalitarian behavior: meritocratic preferences in 
combination with uncertainty about whether income is a signal of performance.  
We also report from a large-scale survey of representative samples of about 1,000 Norwe-
gians and 1,000 Americans. The survey data confirm the external validity of our framework by 
showing that most people do not believe a high income to be a very reliable signal of superior 
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performance. Moreover, the main findings from the laboratory are replicated in the general popu-
lation surveys: meritocratic preferences are very common, and on average, meritocrats react to 
uncertainty by being pulled in the direction of egalitarian behavior. This implies that we find evi-
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Online Appendix A: Experimental Instructions 
Experimental Instructions for the Main Experiment 
SCREEN: WELCOME 
Hi and welcome! 
You will see instructions on your screen and we will also read the instructions to you, so please follow 
along.  
In this experiment you can earn money. The amount will depend on your decisions and the decisions of 
the other participants.  
The experiment has several parts where you can earn money. Instructions will be given ahead of each 
part. 
At the end of the experiment your total earnings will be added to the show-up fee of $5 and you will be 
paid in private, in cash before you leave.  
The experiment is conducted anonymously, and you and all other participants will be identified only by 
code numbers. You can find your code number on the small piece of paper on your desk.  
We will go through the instructions for part 1 now. If you have any questions after you have read and 
heard the instructions, please raise your hand. 
Otherwise, no communication is permitted during the study. You are also not allowed to use mobile 
phones or other electronic devices. Please make sure that these are turned off and put away. 
 
SCREEN: PART 1 
Part 1 
In part 1 of this experiment you will do math tasks consisting of adding numbers. In each task you will 
see five two-digit numbers. Your task is to add them up and provide the correct answer.  
You have five minutes available to do as many of these tasks as you can. You are not allowed to use a 
calculator, but feel free to use the scrap paper that is available on your desk if you like.  
Your performance in this part - how many tasks you did correctly - may influence how much you earn in 
this experiment. Doing more tasks will in that case always be better. 
 




SCREEN: END OF MATH TASK 
It has now been recorded how many math tasks you did correctly.  
Please press ok to proceed.  
 
SCREEN: PAIRING  
Pairs 
All of you who are in this room will be matched in pairs.  
That means that you will be randomly and anonymously matched to another participant who is here.  
You will not be told who the other participant is, and neither will the participant that you are paired with 
be told who you are. 
Earnings from part 1 
In each pair one participant will earn $20 and the other participant $0 for the work done in part 1. Who 
earns the higher earnings in a pair will be determined in one of the following two ways: 
1. By luck. In this case the participant who is lucky in a computerized coin toss earns $20 (and the other 
one earns 0). 
2. By performance. In this case the participant who did most math tasks correctly earns $20 (and the 
other one earns 0). 
 
SCREEN: QUIZ 1  
We will now make sure that everyone has understood the instructions for how the earnings are deter-
mined. When you have answered the questions below, please click the button at the bottom of the screen 
to proceed.  
If any of your answers are incorrect, the computer will tell you so and you have to answer that question 
again. 
Question 1 
Which alternative is true? 
- Both participants in each pair earn $10 
- One participant in the pair earns $20, the other participant earns $0 





Which alternative is true if luck determines who in the pair earns $20? 
- Both participants in the pair have the same chance to earn $20 
- Both participants in the pair will only earn $0 
- The participant in the pair who did most math tasks correctly will for sure earn $20    
 
Question 3 
Which alternative is true if performance determines who in the pair earns $20? 
- Both participants in the pair have the same chance to earn $20 
- Both participants in the pair will only earn $0 
- The participant in the pair who did most math tasks correctly will for sure earn $20 
 
SCREEN: PART 2  
Part 2 
Part 2 will be about the distribution of earnings from part 1.  
Remember that all participants who are here have been placed in pairs and that one person in the pair has 
received earnings of $20 from part 1 whereas the other person in the pair has received $0.  
You have been matched to one of these pairs. Your task is to decide how this pair's total earnings from 
part 1 will be split between the two of them.  
You will see several such situations where you have to make this decision. One of the situations that you 
will see is fact exactly what has happened to the pair. With 50 percent probability your decision in this 
situation will determine these participants' payoff from part 1 (with 50 percent probability it is determined 
by another participant, but it is never determined by anyone in the pair).  
In the same way someone else in this room will determine how the total earnings in the pair in which you 
are one of the two people will be split between the two of you.  
Please note that you will make the distribution decision for two other participants, i.e. NOT for yourself 
and the one you are paired with. In the same way, someone else will make the distribution decision for 
you and whoever you are paired with. 
The decisions in part 2 are final, i.e they decide how earnings from part 1 will be split in the pairs and 




We will now make sure that everyone has understood the instructions for part 2 correctly. When you have 
answered the questions below, please click the button at the bottom of the screen to proceed.  
If any of your answers are incorrect, the computer will tell you so and you get to answer that question 
again. 
 
SCREEN: QUIZ 2 
Question 1 
In part 2 you will be matched to two other participants. Who decides how their earnings are split between 
them? 
- They decide together. 
- One of them decides. 
- I or another participant (but not one of them) decide. 
 
Question 2 
In part 2 you have also been matched with one other participant to form a pair. Who decides how your 
earnings are split between you? 
- Another participant decides.  
- I decide. 
- The other person in the pair decides. 
 
SCREEN: POST-QUIZ 2 REMINDER 
Everyone has now completed the quiz.  
You will soon make the decisions regarding the split of the earnings of two other players. Remember that 
your choices are NOT about your own payoffs but about the payoffs of two other people in this room. 
Also, remember that it is always the case that it has been determined in one of two ways who in a pair 
earns $20 from part 1 and  who earns $0: 
1. By luck. In this case the participant who is lucky in a computerized coin toss earns $20 (and the other 
one earns 0). 
2. By performance. In this case the participant who did most math tasks correctly earns $20 (and the 




In a particular scenario you may not know whether it was luck or performance that caused a participant to 
earn $20 or $0.  
You will, however, be told the probability that performance determined the earnings. 
 
SCREEN: QUIZ 3 
We will now make sure that everyone has understood these additional instructions for part 2 correctly. 
When you have answered the question below, please click the button at the bottom of the screen to pro-
ceed.  
If your answer is incorrect, the computer will tell you so and you get to answer the question again. 
 
Question 1 
Consider the following situation as an example: Person 1 earned $20 from part 1 and Person 2 earned $0.  
You are told that with probability [x] percent, this was determined by performance (i.e. Person 1 perform-
ing better than Person 2) and with probability [100-x] percent, this was determined by luck.  
Which alternative is true? 
- The earnings were for sure determined by performance. 
- There is some chance that the earnings were determined by performance, and some chance that they 
were determined by luck. 
- The earnings were for sure determined by luck. 
 
SCREEN: POST QUIZ 3/REMINDER 
Everyone has now completed the quiz.  
You will now make the decisions regarding the split of the earnings of two other players.  
You will face several situations and one of them is the situation that has actually happened to the pair.  
Remember that your choices are NOT about your own payoffs but about the payoffs of two other people 






SCREEN: DECISIONS (7 SCREENS) 
Decision 1[2,3,4,5,6,7] 
 
The probability that the outcome was determined by luck was [x] 
The probability that the outcome was determined by performance was [x] 
Person 1 
Dollars earned: 0/20 
How much do you want this person to earn? 
[0-20] 
Person 2 
Dollars earned: 20/0 
How much do you want this person to earn? 
[0-20] 
Your input must sum to 20. Press “OK” when you have made your decision 
 
 
SCREEN: END OF PART 2 
Part 2 is now finished. The split of the earnings for all pairs, including yours, has been decided and is fi-
nal.  
You will be told what your earnings are at the end of the experiment. 
 
SCREEN: PART 3 
Part 3 
We will now continue with part 3, which is the last part of the experiment.  
In part 3 you will be asked nine questions. For each question you answer correctly, your payoffs from the 
experiment will increase with $0.5.  
Your payoffs from part 3 only depends on whether you answer these questions correctly or not, not on 
what any other participant does. 




SCREEN: PROBABILITY QUESTIONS (9 SCREENS) 
Question 1[2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9] 
Imagine a lottery where there is a 10 [95,5,100,50,1,99,0,90] percent probability of winning a prize.  
You buy 100 lottery tickets and give each of your 100 best facebook friends one lottery ticket.  
Statistically speaking, how many of the 100 facebook friends would you expect to win a prize? 
 
SCREEN: PAYOFF SCREEN 
Your payoff from Part 1: x 
Your partner`s payoff: x 
Your payoff from part 3: x 





Experimental Instructions – Compound Uncertainty extension 
SCREEN: WELCOME 
Hi and welcome! 
You will see instructions on your screen and we will also read the instructions to you, so please follow 
along.  
In this experiment you can earn money. The amount will depend on your decisions and the decisions of 
the other participants.  
The experiment has several parts where you can earn money. Instructions will be given ahead of each 
part. 
At the end of the experiment your total earnings will be added to the show-up fee of $5 and you will be 
paid in private, in cash before you leave.  
The experiment is conducted anonymously, and you and all other participants will be identified only by 
code numbers. You can find your code number on the small piece of paper on your desk.  
We will go through the instructions for part 1 now. If you have any questions after you have read and 
heard the instructions, please raise your hand. 
Otherwise, no communication is permitted during the study. You are also not allowed to use mobile 
phones or other electronic devices. Please make sure that these are turned off and put away. 
 
SCREEN: PART 1 
Part 1 
In part 1 of this experiment you will do math tasks consisting of adding numbers. In each task you will 
see five two-digit numbers. Your task is to add them up and provide the correct answer. 
You have five minutes available to do as many of these tasks as you can. You are not allowed to use a 
calculator, but feel free to use the scrap paper that is available on your desk if you like. 
Your performance in this part - how many tasks you did correctly - may influence how much you earn in 
this experiment. Doing more tasks will in that case always be better. 
 





SCREEN: END OF MATH TASK 
It has now been recorded how many math tasks you did correctly.  
Please press ok to proceed.  
 
SCREEN: PAIRING  
Pairs 
All of you who are in this room will be matched in pairs.  
That means that you will be randomly and anonymously matched to another participant who is here. 
You will not be told who the other participant is, and neither will the participant that you are paired with 
be told who you are. 
Earnings from part 1 
In each pair one participant will earn $20 and the other participant $0 for the work done in part 1. Who 
earns the higher earnings in a pair will be determined in one of the following two ways: 
1. By luck. In this case the participant who is lucky in a computerized coin toss earns $20 (and the other 
one earns 0). 
2. By performance. In this case the participant who did most math tasks correctly earns $20 (and the 
other one earns 0). 
 
SCREEN: QUIZ 1  
We will now make sure that everyone has understood the instructions for how the earnings are deter-
mined. When you have answered the questions below, please click the button at the bottom of the screen 
to proceed.  




Which alternative is true? 
- Both participants in each pair earn $10 
- One participant in the pair earns $20, the other participant earns $0 
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- One participant in the pair earns $15, the other participant earns $55 
 
Question 2 
Which alternative is true if luck determines who in the pair earns $20? 
- Both participants in the pair have the same chance to earn $20 
- Both participants in the pair will only earn $0 
- The participant in the pair who did most math tasks correctly will for sure earn $20    
 
Question 3 
Which alternative is true if performance determines who in the pair earns $20? 
- Both participants in the pair have the same chance to earn $20 
- Both participants in the pair will only earn $0 
- The participant in the pair who did most math tasks correctly will for sure earn $20 
 
 
SCREEN: PART 2  
Part 2 
Part 2 will be about the distribution of earnings from part 1. 
Remember that all participants who are here have been placed in pairs and that one person in the pair has 
received earnings of $20 from part 1 whereas the other person in the pair has received $0. 
You have been matched to one of these pairs. Your task is to decide how this pair's total earnings from 
part 1 will be split between the two of them. 
You will see several such situations where you have to make this decision. One of the situations that you 
will see is fact exactly what has happened to the pair. With 50 percent probability your decision in this 
situation will determine these participants' payoff from part 1 (with 50 percent probability it is determined 
by another participant, but it is never determined by anyone in the pair). 
In the same way someone else in this room will determine how the total earnings in the pair in which you 
are one of the two people will be split between the two of you. 
Please note that you will make the distribution decision for two other participants, i.e. NOT for yourself 
and the one you are paired with. In the same way, someone else will make the distribution decision for 
you and whoever you are paired with. 
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The decisions in part 2 are final, i.e they decide how earnings from part 1 will be split in the pairs and 
thus the payouts that the participants in the pair will receive from part 1.  
We will now make sure that everyone has understood the instructions for part 2 correctly. When you have 
answered the questions below, please click the button at the bottom of the screen to proceed. 
If any of your answers are incorrect, the computer will tell you so and you get to answer that question 
again. 
 
SCREEN: QUIZ 2 
Question 1 
In part 2 you will be matched to two other participants. Who decides how their earnings are split between 
them? 
- They decide together. 
- One of them decides. 
- I or another participant (but not one of them) decide. 
 
Question 2 
In part 2 you have also been matched with one other participant to form a pair. Who decides how your 
earnings are split between you? 
- Another participant decides.  
- I decide. 
- The other person in the pair decides. 
 
SCREEN: POST-QUIZ 2 REMINDER 
Everyone has now completed the quiz.  
You will soon make the decisions regarding the split of the earnings of two other players. Remember that 
your choices are NOT about your own payoffs but about the payoffs of two other people in this room. 
Also, remember that it is always the case that it has been determined in one of two ways who in a pair 
earns $20 from part 1 and  who earns $0: 
1. By luck. In this case the participant who is lucky in a computerized coin toss earns $20 (and the other 
one earns 0). 
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2. By performance. In this case the participant who did most math tasks correctly earns $20 (and the 
other one earns 0). 
In a particular scenario you may not know whether it was luck or performance that caused a participant to 
earn $20 or $0.In this experiment there are 7 different probabilities that the outcome was determined by 
performance: 0 percent, 1 percent, 10 percent, 50 percent, 90 percent, 99 percent or 100 percent. 
For each pair there is an equal chance of either of these probabilities being used to determine the out-
come.  
 
SCREEN: QUIZ 3 
We will now make sure that everyone has understood these additional instructions for part 2 correctly. 
When you have answered the question below, please click the button at the bottom of the screen to pro-
ceed.  
If your answer is incorrect, the computer will tell you so and you get to answer the question again. 
 
Question 1 [control] 
Consider the following situation as an example: Person 1 earned $20 from part 1 and Person 2 earned $0.  
You are told that with probability [x] percent, this was determined by performance (i.e. Person 1 perform-
ing better than Person 2) and with probability [100-x] percent, this was determined by luck.  
Which alternative is true? 
- The earnings were for sure determined by performance. 
- There is some chance that the earnings were determined by performance, and some chance that they 
were determined by luck. 
- The earnings were for sure determined by luck. 
 
Question 1 [treatment] 
Consider the following situation as an example: Person 1 earned $20 from part 1 and Person 2 earned $0.  
You are told that this was determined by either performance or luck. 
Which alternative is true? 
- The earnings were for sure determined by performance. 
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- There is some chance that the earnings were determined by performance, and some chance that they 
were determined by luck. 
- The earnings were for sure determined by luck. 
 
SCREEN: POST QUIZ 3/REMINDER 
Everyone has now completed the quiz.  
You will now make the decisions regarding the split of the earnings of two other players.  
You will face several situations and one of them is the situation that has actually happened to the pair.  
Remember that your choices are NOT about your own payoffs but about the payoffs of two other people 
in this room. 
 
SCREEN: DECISIONS (7 SCREENS) [control treatment] 
Decision 1[2,3,4,5,6,7] 
 
The probability the outcome was determined by luck was [x] 
The probability the outcome was determined by performance was [x] 
Person 1 
Dollars earned: 0/20 
How much do you want this person to earn? 
[0-20] 
Person 2 
Dollars earned: 20/0 
How much do you want this person to earn? 
[0-20] 












The outcome was determined either by luck or performance. 
Person 1 
Dollars earned: 0/20 
How much do you want this person to earn? 
[0-20] 
Person 2 
Dollars earned: 20/0 
How much do you want this person to earn? 
[0-20] 
Your input must sum to 20. Press “OK” when you have made your decision 
 
SCREEN: END OF PART 2 
Part 2 is now finished. The split of the earnings for all pairs, including yours, has been decided and is fi-
nal.  
You will be told what your earnings are at the end of the experiment. 
 
SCREEN: PART 3 
Part 3 
We will now continue with part 3, which is the last part of the experiment.  
In part 3 you will be asked nine questions. For each question you answer correctly, your payoffs from the 
experiment will increase with $0.5.  
Your payoffs from part 3 only depends on whether you answer these questions correctly or not, not on 
what any other participant does. 





SCREEN: PROBABILITY QUESTIONS (9 SCREENS) 
Question 1[2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9] 
Imagine a lottery where there is a 10 [95,5,100,50,1,99,0,90] percent probability of winning a prize.  
You buy 100 lottery tickets and give each of your 100 best facebook friends one lottery ticket.  
Statistically speaking, how many of the 100 facebook friends would you expect to win a prize? 
 
SCREEN: PAYOFF SCREEN 
Your payoff from Part 1: x 
Your partner`s payoff: x 
Your payoff from part 3: x 









Online Appendix B: Additional Analysis of the Laboratory Data 
Here we provide some additional analysis referred to in the main text. 
B1. Analysis of participants’ first choice only 
We show here that the main results on aggregate behavior are robust to restricting the analysis to 
the first choice of each spectator. 
Figure B1: Share Redistributed for Different Values of p - Only First Choice 
 
Notes: The figure provides an overview of the average share redistributed in each of the seven situations considered 
in the experiment when restricted to the first choice by each spectator (222 choices). It was randomly determined 
which situation was the first choice of each individual, and thus a comparison of any two shares in this figures pro-


















0.50 0.505 0.55 0.75 0.95 0.995 1.00
Probability that the high earner is the high performer, p
50 
 
Table B1: Share Redistributed as a Function of p - Only First Choice 
 
 (1) (2) 

































Observations 222 222 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p  <  0.05, ** p  <  0.01, *** p  <  0.001 
 
Note: OLS regressions utilizing the first choice for each participant (n = 222). The dependent variable is the share 
that the spectators redistribute to the lower earner. Standard errors in parentheses. (1) shows the result from a 
model linear in p (the probability that the high earner was also the best performer), while (2) uses a dummy for each 





B2. Analysis excluding participants with limited statistical knowledge 
In Part 3 of the experiment, there were nine incentivized questions about the concept of probability (see 
online Appendix A for details). The analysis below includes only participants who answered eight or nine 
questions correctly, i.e., 35 participants with seven or fewer correct answers were excluded.  
 
Figure B2: Share Redistributed for Different Values of p – Excluding Participants with Lim-
ited Statistical Knowledge 
 
Notes: The figure provides an overview of the average share redistributed in each of the seven situations considered 



















0.50 0.505 0.55 0.75 0.95 0.995 1.00
Probability that the high earner is the high performer, p
52 
 
Table B2: Share Redistributed as a Function of p – Excluding Participants with Limited Sta-
tistical Knowledge 
 
 (1) (2) 

































Observations 1309 1309 
 
Note: OLS regressions excluding participants with limited statistical knowledge (n = 187, i.e. 35 participants were 
excluded). The dependent variable is the share that the spectators redistribute to the lower earner. Standard errors 
(clustered at the level of individual spectators) in parentheses. (1) shows the result from a model linear in p (the 
probability that the high earner was also the best performer), while (2) uses a dummy for each level of p. Omitted 
variable in specification (2) is p = 0.5. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
 
 
In Figure B3, we report the individual-level analysis. Among the participants with eight or nine correct 
answers in the statistical quiz (187 in total), there are 143 meritocrats who redistribute 47.8 percent (stand-
ard error = 2.22, median =50 percent) when p=0.5 and 12 percent (standard error = 1.20, median = 0) when 
p=1. The average share distributed to the high performer when p is equal to one, 𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃 , is 0.88. The median 








Figure B3: Individual Calibrations for the Meritocrats – Excluding Participants with Limited 
Statistical Knowledge 
Panel A: Distribution of 𝒔𝒔𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭  
 
Panel B: Distribution of estimated 𝜶𝜶  
 
Notes: The figures shows the distribution of share allocated to the best performer when p = 1 (Panel A) and the esti-
mated 𝛼𝛼 (Panel B) for meritocrats who correctly answered more than seven out of nine of the statistical questions in 
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B3. Analysis of individuals who are not meritocrats  
The main analysis focuses on the 168 individuals who are classified as meritocrats. Seven of the 
168 meritocrats redistribute zero for all values of p. Theoretically, they may either be defined as strict 
libertarians (who never want to redistribute), or as meritocrats with 𝛼𝛼 = 1 (i.e. meritocrats who experience 
no egalitarian pull under uncertainty). In order to bias the analysis against our hypothesis of there being a 
significant and strong egalitarian pull to the behavior of meritocrats under uncertainty, these seven merito-
crats are included in Panel B of Figure 3 as meritocrats with 𝛼𝛼 = 1. The value of the median 𝛼𝛼 does not 
change if these seven spectators are instead classified as strict libertarians and not included among the 
meritocrats. Below we provide histograms and a comparison of the treatments for the remaining 54 indi-
viduals (24 out of these are strict egalitarians in the sense that they divide equally in all the seven situations).  
 
Figure B4: Histograms of Share Redistributed for Different Values of p – including only par-
























Notes: The histograms provide an overview of the share redistributed in each of the seven situations for the partici-




Figure B5: Share Redistributed for Different Values of p – including only those not classified 
as meritocrats. 
 
Notes: The figure provides an overview of the average share redistributed in each of the seven situations considered 
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B4. Analysis of the experimental extension 
We here provide some further analysis of the experimental extension.  
 
Table B3: Pairwise Comparisons of Mean Share Redistributed in the Main Experiment and in 
the Control Treatment in the Experimental Extension 
 
Probability that the high 










Notes: The reported p-values are from t-tests evaluating the null (equal means) against an alternative that the 
means are not equal.  
 
Figure B6: Individual Calibrations for the Meritocrats in the control group of the experi-
mental extension 
Panel A: Distribution of 𝒔𝒔𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭  
 
Panel B: Distribution of estimated 𝜶𝜶  
 
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the estimated 𝛼𝛼 for the control treatment of the experimental extension. 
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Online Appendix C: Survey Materials 
Q: I have read and understood the above and want to participate in this study 
Q: What is your current age? 
Q: What is your gender? 
Male 
Female 
Q: In which state do you live? 
Q: What is your marital status? 
Single 
Living with parents 
Married/Partnership/Domestic partnership (without kids in the household) 
Married/Partnership/Domestic partnership (with kids in the household) 
Widow/widower 
Other 
Do not wish to answer 
Q: How many people live in your household? 
Q: What is your household's ANNUAL income (before taxes)? 
Less than $24.999 
$25.000 to $49.999 
$50.000 to $99.999 
$100.000 to $149.999 
$150.000 or more 
I do not wish to answer 
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I don’t identify with a party 
Q: What is your highest level of completed education? 
Middle school 
High school 
University/college, 1-3/4 years (Bachelor’s/undergraduate degree) 
University/college/graduate school, 4+ years (Master’s degree) 
University/college/graduate school, 5+ years (Doctorate, professor degree) 
Other 
Q We would like you to indicate to what extent you find it fair that the following factors 
determine a person's income. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements:  
a) It is fair if talent determines a person's income. 
b) It is fair if luck determines a person's income. 
c) It is fair if hard work determines a person's income. 
(Scale 0-10, from completely disagree to completely agree) 
Q: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
In society, it is typically the case that people with a higher income have done a better job than 
people with a lower income.  
(Scale 0-10, from completely disagree to completely agree) 
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Q: Consider a situation where Andrew and Bob were asked to do a job. They were told that 
the best performer would get a bonus of USD 200, and that the other would get zero. Assume 
that everyone (including yourself) agrees that this is fair. 
The problem is that there is uncertainty about who was the best performer. Suppose that 
you learn that it is more likely that Andrew did the best job. With 75 percent probability he was 
the best performer, and with 25 percent probability Bob was the best performer. Without knowing 
any more, how much of the USD 200 would you have given to Andrew and how much to Bob? 
The total has to equal 200.  
Q: When it comes to social issues, how liberal or conservative are you?  
(Scale 0-10, from very liberal to very conservative) 
Q: When it comes to economic issues, how liberal or conservative are you?  




Online Appendix D: Additional Analysis of Survey Data 
We here provide a more detailed analysis of the survey data as referred to in the main text. 
D1 Cross country analysis 
Table D1: Cross Country Analysis of Share Given to Andrew  
 
 
D2. Analysis of political differences 
Both among Republicans and Democrats in the US, and among the right and the left of center in 
Norway, it is considered most fair when income is determined by hard work. There is no significant 
difference between Republicans and Democrats (8.66 vs 8.52, p=0.360) but people on the right in 
Norway find it more fair to base income on hard work than people on the left (8.55 vs 8.21, 
p<0.001). Talent as a factor determining income is seen as significantly less fair, and 
fairtalent<fairwork for all groups (p<0.001). Republicans find it more fair than Democrats do that 
income is based on talent (7.46 vs 6.92, p<0.001), and the same holds for the right-left comparison 
in Norway (6.31 vs 5.74, p<0.001). As for luck, Democrats find it unfair when it makes the base 
for income than republicans do (4.11 vs 4.61, p<0.05) and this also holds when comparing the 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Norway -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.065***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)








Additional controls no no no yes
N 2020 2020 2020 1748
Notes: Dependent variable is the share of the bonus given to Andrew 
(who with 75 percent likelihood was the best performer). All other 
definitions as in Table 2. Additional control variables: age, gender and 
household income (in USD)
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right and left in Norway (2.52 and 1.91, p<0.001). These differences are not so large as to make 
the share of meritocrats different among Republicans and Democrats (68 and 65 percent respec-
tively, p=0.3679) nor among the right and the left in Norway (82 and 80 percent, p=0.1048) 
The extent to which a person finds income being informative of superior performance also 
varies with where on the political spectrum a person stands. Republicans find income more in-
formative than Democrats (5.95 vs 5.05, p<0.001), as do those to the right of center in Norway 
compared to those left of center (3.92 vs 2.87, p<0.001). Finally, there is a difference between 
people in various parts of the political spectrum in how they react to uncertainty. In the question 
about Andrew and Bob, Republicans are significantly more likely to give the full reward to An-
drew (26 percent of Republicans and 14 percent of the Democrats do that, p<0.001) as are the right 
of center in Norway (whereas 12 percent of the right of center give everything to Andew, only 7 
percent of the left do the same, p<0.001). On average, Republicans give 73 percent to Andrew and 
Democrats give 68 percent (p<0.001). In Norway, those identifying with a right of center party 
give Andrew 66 percent, compared to those left of center who give 62 percent (p<0.001).  
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